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Comments
THE EQUAL BIGHTS AMENDMENT: ITS MEANING
AND ITS IMPACT ON MISSOURI LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 22, 1972, the Senate of the United States passed the pro-
posed Equal lights Amendment (hereinafter ERA). 1 The House of Repre-
sentatives had previously passed the resolution on October 12, 1971.2 Pres-
ently, the legislatures of the fifty states are considering whether or not to
ratify the proposed amendment,3 and thereby, make it the twenty-seventh
amendment to the United States Constitution.4 The topic of this comment
will be the meaning and scope of the ERA together with its probable im-
pact on Missouri law.
In terms of text, the amendment is short and simple. It decrees that:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.
This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.5
Despite the simplicity of its language, the purpose of the ERA is sig-
nificant. The ERA is intended to rid the law of classifictions based on
stereotypes of the female and male sexes. Classifications which discriminate
against one sex will be permitted only if they are based on the actual
characteristics of individuals.6 Thus, it would permit classifications based
on characteristics that are often associated with women (e.g., status as
child raiser or lesser physical strength). However, the ERA forbids classi-
fications which use sex as a shorthand terminology for these characteristics.
That a characteristic is found more often in one sex than in the other
does not justify different treatment of the sexes under the law.7 For ex-
ample, it is probably true that there are more men who can lift fifty pounds
without great difficulty than there are women who can do the siame.
However, the ERA would invalidate legislation forbidding an employer to
require a woman employee to lift fifty pounds, unless it also forbade an
employer to require a man to do the same thing." The legislation could
1. 118 CONG. REc. 9598 (1972).
2. 117 CONG. REc. 85815 (1971).
8. Currently, 88 state legislatures have ratified the amendment.
4. Article Five of the United States Constitution requires that three-
fourths of the state legislatures ratify an amendment to make it a part of the
Constitution.
5. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
6. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 859,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) (minority views). The minority views of the dis-
senting members of the committee are relevant to our inquiry into the meaning
of the amendment, because the resolution as it was reported by the House
Judiciary Committee was rejected by the full House. 117 CONG. REC. 35818
(1971).
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forbid an employer to require anyone who cannot do so without great
difficulty to lift fifty pounds, so long as that aptitude was determined by
the employer on an individual basis, rather than a sexual basis.
The philosophical basis of the amendment is that every individual,
whether man or woman, should be allowed to develop to his fullest poten-
tial without being subject to legal restrictions and burdens imposed under
a stereotyped view of the potentialities of his or her sex.9 Proponents of
the ERA regard any restrictions or benefits placed on one sex for the stated
purpose of promoting the health and safety of the members of that sex, as
efforts to create a degree of legal supremacy not found in nature.10
To encapsule all of this into a phrase familiar to the legal profession
would be to say that, under the ERA, sex becomes a "suspect" classifica-
tion.1' Currently, under fourteenth amendment equal protection, the pre-
vailing view is that the state need only show a rational basis to sustain
classifications based on sex.12 The drafters of the ERA obviously intend
that sex classifications will be subject to a more stringent standard of judi-
cial review.13 Probably, the test under the ERA will be similar to that of
the equal protection clause with respect to laws which on their face dis-
criminate against race or nationality.' 4
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id, at 5.
11. Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedmon (hereinafter referred to as
"Emerson"), The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889 (1971); Ryman, A Comment on
Family Property Rights and the Proposed 27th Amendment, 22 DRAxE L. REv.
505, 511-12 (1973).
Some opponents of the amendment believe that it imposes an absolute
standard so that all classifications based on sex will be invalid. See the letter
submitted to the committee by Professor Freund in Hearings on H.R.I. Res. 208
Before the House Comm. on the judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 610 (1971).
12. See United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The majority opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), asserts
that classifications based on sex are now "suspect" classifications. However, only
four justices joined in this opinion. The remainder were unwilling to accept such
a change in the law.
In Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974), six of the justices clearly held
that a rational basis was sufficient justification for sex discrimination in economic
matters, distinguishing Frontiero as involving only "administrative convenience"
as attempted justification. The district courts are so interpreting Kahn v. Shevin:
Kohr v. Weinberger, 43 U.S.L.W. 2066 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 1974); Crawford v.
Cushman, 43 U.S.L.W. 2053 (D. Vt. July 12, 1974); Edwards v. Schlisinger,
43 U.S.L.W. 2009 (D.D.C. June 19, 1974).
13. One of the major reasons for the creation of the ERA and the efforts
to secure its ratification is that the courts have, in the past, declined to treat
classifications based on sex as "suspect" classifications under the equal protection
clause. Emerson, supra note 11, at 875-82.
14. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 359,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) (minority views).
The most explicit test for deciding whether a "suspect" classification is in-
valid under the equal protection clause was utilized in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). The Court stated that such a classification must be shown to be
necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective independent
of the objective of racial discrimination. Id. at 11.
(Vol. 39
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There are two exceptions to the ERAs general prohibition against sex
classifications. The ERA would permit reasonable classifications based on
physical characteristics that are truly unique to one sex, since such classi-
fications would be concerned with the attributes of individuals rather than
with those of a stereotype.15 It appears from the legislative history of the
amendment that the term "physical characteristics" is to be regarded liter-
ally.' Thus, certain sociological and psychological characteristics commonly
but incorrectly attributed to all women (e.g., incapacity to engage in busi-
ness or make investments, the inclination or tendency to become home-
makers, or other characteristics which actually result from social condition-
ing and classifications) do not come within this exception.
A second exception to the prohibition appears to be laws which re-
quire or permit separation of the sexes for purposes which are protected
by the constitutional right to privacy.1'7 Examples of laws fitting into this
category are laws requiring or permitting separate restrooms, and laws
permitting or requiring separate dormitories or barracks for women.x8 If
the courts do not agree with the proponents of the amendment that Gris-
wold v. Connecticut9 compels the right to be separated from the opposite
sex for certain purposes, it is unclear whether the ERA would continue to
permit such separation.
The amendment, by its terms, limits its application to the activities of
the federal and state governments. The same body of law governing the
coverage of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause would also
govern the coverage of the ERA; the application of the ERA will be limited
to situations involving "state action."20 Consequently, in the area of sex
15. H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) (minority view).
The familiar example of such a classification is maternity benefits for those who
become pregnant and have children. The capacity to become pregnant is a
physical characteristic unique to women.
See Emerson, supra note 11, at 895-96. This article suggests the following
factors in determining whether a legislative classification directed at a particular
problem permissibly relates to physical characteristics truly unique to one sex:
(a) The proportion of the sex who actually have the characteristic;
(b) the relationship between the characteristic and the problem;
(c) the portion of the problem attributable to the unique physical charac-
teristics of that sex;
d) the proportion of the problem eliminated by the solution;
e) the availability of less drastic' alternatives; and
(f) the importance of the problem ostensibly being solved as compared
with the costs of the least drastic solution.
16. The Senate rejected a provision in the ERA permitting laws to make
distinctions between the rights and responsibilities of men and women based
on physiological or functional differences. 118 CONe. REc. 9588 (1972).
17. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Supreme Court
held that a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives as it applies to
married women violated their constitutional right of privacy.
The Senate rejected a provision that the ERA would not invalidate any laws
which secure privacy to men or women, 118 CONG. REc. 9537 (1972).
18. Section 292.160, RSMo 1969, requires employers who employ both men
and women to provide separate restrooms.
19. 881 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) (minority view).
,1974]
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discrimination in employment, the amendment will not prohibit sex dis-
crimination by private employers. Sex discrimination in the private sector is
barred by other federal and state legislation.21
If the ERA is ratified and the various state legislatures and Congress
fail to revise legislation within the two year period provided by the ERA,
courts will face a perplexing problem. Once a law is found to violate the
ERA, a court will have to decide whether to invalidate that law or to
extend the coverage of the law to the sex not previously covered. For laws
not involving criminal penalties, the courts will be free to utilize either
alternative. As a guide for statutory laws, the courts should observe the
legislative history of the statute in question (if available) to ascertain what
the legislature would have done if faced with the same problem.22 With
respect to case law which offends the ERA, the courts will have to resort
to their own judicial ingenuity and look at the reasons and principles on
which the case law rule rests. Criminal statutes which violate the ERA will
have to be invalidated by the courts. The courts have declared that they
will always strictly construe a criminal statute so as to avoid creating crimes
not expressly defined on the face of the statute.23
If ratified, the ERA would undoubtedly result in a number of changes
in laws and regulations which affect our lives. The remainder of this com-
ment will focus on those areas of Missouri law which would be affected
by the amendment and suggest legislative and judicial alternatives which
would comply with the amendment.
21. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars employment discrimina-
tion based on sex by employers of fifteen or more persons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(Supp. III, 1973). §§ 296.010(2), .020, RSMo 1973 Supp., bar sexual dis-
crruination for all employers in the state employing six or more persons.
22. Emerson, supra note 11, at 913-16. The Senate Judiciary Committee
report, relying on a survey of prior equal protection and Title VII cases, puts
forth the rather simplified rule that laws which restrict one sex's activity should
be nullified, while those which extend a meaningful protection or benefit to one
sex should be expanded to include the other sex. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1972). In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Supreme Court faced this issue without
explicitly recognizing it as an issue.
In Reed, the Court reversed and remanded the reinstatement of a probate
court order which had appointed a male as an administrator of an estate on the
basis of a statutory preference for males. The result of this action was to require
the probate court to designate an administrator on the basis of factors other than
sex.
In Frontiero, the Court reversed a lower court's dismissal of the female
armed service member's complaint which sought an order directing the Secretary
of Defense to provide her with dependency benefits, even though she had been
unable to show that her husband was, in fact, dependent upon her. Conceivably,
the Court could have held that all servicemen and servicewomen must actually
prove that their spouses were dependent upon them; but, because of the obvious
administrative burden which would result, the Court chose to give the plaintiff
the benefit of the same presumption that was already available to servicemen.
23. This approach was recognized in State v. Wilbur, 462 S.W.2d 658(Mo. 1971). See S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972).
[Vol. 39
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II. ImPAcr oF Tm EQuAL RIcHTS AmEMENT ON Missouri LAW
A. Protective Labor Legislation
The area of protective labor legislation can be divided into two parts:
(1) special benefits legislation and (2) legislation excluding women or
men from various occupations and work activities. In passing on the
validity of such legislation under the ERA, the courts will find a helpful
source of precedent in the body of cases deciding the validity of such
legislation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 Title VII
bars sexual discrimination in employment by employers of fifteen or more
persons in an "industry affecting commerce." 25 Though Title VII applies
to a limited class of employers, it would be safe to assume, for our purposes,
that if a statutory classification were found to be invalid under Title VII, it
would also be invalid under the ERA. For example, prior to 1973, a Missouri
statute26 prohibited women from working more than nine hours a day or
more than fifty-four hours a week in most places of employment. The
statute clearly discriminated on the basis of sex and was found not to be
a defense to a violation of Title VII.27 Such a statute would violate the
ERA because this limitation on a woman's right to work cannot reasonably
be based on any physical characteristic unique to women.
1. Special Benefits Legislation
Section 29.150, RSMo 1969, provides that in every place of work in
which unclean work is performed and which employs women, a place to
wash and dress shall be provided for such women. Section 292.170, RSMo
1969, provides that every place employing women shall provide seats in
which the women may sit when their job does not require them to be on
their feet, and requires that during such times the women shall be allowed
to sit. These statutes probably violate the ERA, because there is no legiti-
mate justification for extending these privileges only to women.28 The
mere fact that more women than men may need such statutory benefits is
an insufficient justification for the statutes in that some men also need
such benefits.
Assuming that a court would deem these statutes violative of the ERA,
it would be faced with the more difficult issue of whether to nullify these
statutes or extend their benefits to men.29 To extend the benefits to men
would, perhaps, comply more closely with the general purposes of such
legislation.3" However, it could be argued that such an extension would
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. III, 1973).
25. Id.
26. § 290.040, RSMo 1969.
27. Vogel v. Trans World Airlines, 346 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
28. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1972).
29. See text accompanying notes 22-23.
30. S. R P. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972) suggests that these
benefits should be extended to men. Where statutes have been invalidated under
Title VII, the courts have differed in their resolution of this issue. Compare
Potlach Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd 465
F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972) (the court extended the benefits to men) with Home-
makers, Inc., Los Angeles v. Division of Indus. Wel., 356 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D.
1974] -
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create a hardship for many employers that could not have been intended
by the legislature. Moreover, section 292.210, RSMo 1969, provides a
criminal penalty for failing to comply with these statutes. Thus, an exten-
sion of the coverage of these statutes would create crimes not expressly
set forth in these statutes.
2. Laws Excluding Women or Men from Certain
Occupations or Work Activities
Certain Missouri statutes exclude women from specified occupations.31
The purpose behind these statutes is to protect women from being forced
to work at a job which many women would be incapable of performing
well, or which might be detrimental to their health. However, some women
would be able to perform these jobs as satisfactorily as men. The argument
that a certain job would be detrimental to their health undoubtedly per-
tains to some men also.32 Since the classifications are based on a stereo-
typed view of women rather than distinguishing physical characteristics,
they would be invalid under the ERA. The courts would probably nullify,
rather than expand these statutes, since the expansion of coverage to men
would terminate the named occupations completely.
Sections 216.225, .375, RSMo 1969, are examples of statutory exclusion
of men from an occupation. They require that the state prison for women
be under the immediate supervision of a woman superintendent. The ERA
would invalidate these statutes also, because there is insufficient justifica-
tion for classification on the mere basis of sex.
A Missouri statute also prohibits an employer from requiring a female
employee to clean any part of a machine while it is in motion, and from
requiring her to work between the fixed transverse part of a machine,
except one operated by her.33 However protective of health and safety this
statute is, men need such protection as much as do women. Due to insuffi-
cient basis for the classification, this statute would be invalid under the
amendment. In view of its purpose, to protect and to promote safety, a
court might determine it preferable to expand such protection to men,
rather than eliminate it for both sexes.
3. Maternity Leaves
Many employers, public and private, impose maternity leaves on their
pregnant female employees. Such leaves usually require them to give notice
Cal. 1973) (the court refused to extend the benefits to men because to do so
would be an exercise of legislative power).
31. E.g., § 293.060, RSMo 1969 (women should not be employed in or
about mines except in a clerical capacity); § 564.680 RSMo 1969 (girls under
the age of 18 are not to be employed as telegraphic messengers); § 71.200, RSMo
1969 (authorizes cities of 5,000 or more to appoint women as members of their
police forces, prescribe their duties, and provide for their compensation).
In regard to § 71.200, tlSMo 1969, it should be noted that statutes granting
authority to municipalities are usually strictly construed by the courts. See City
of Springfield v. Cloose, 356 Mo. 1239, 1252, 206 S.W.2d 539, 546 (En Banc
1947). Thus, the statute may be read as prohibiting cities of less than 5,000
people from hiring women as police officers.
32. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972).
38. § 292.040, RSMo 1969.
(Vol. 39
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of their pregnancy, and to leave their job at some fixed time period before
the expected date of birth. Frequently, the employers prohibit her from
returning to work until several weeks after the delivery.
Prior to 1973, Missouri legislation required a minimum maternity leave
which prohibited a pregnant woman from working within three weeks of
the date of birth and for three weeks thereafter. 34 Such requirements have
been challenged as violations of the equal protection clause35 and Title VII
of the Civil Bights Act.38 Perhaps, for this reason the stautae was repealed
in 1973. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that maternity leaves which
require a pregnant woman to leave her job as a public school teacher at
the fourth or fifth months of pregnancy, rather than when she and her
physician decide that she is no longer able to work, violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.37
Section 288.040, RSMo 1969, precludes a pregnant woman from obtain-
ing unemployment benefits for a period of time ranging from three months
before childbirth until four weeks thereafter. Since the ability to work is
one of the general requirements for eligibility for unemployment benefits,38
it appears that the statute creates a conclusive presumption that pregnant
women are unable to work during the aforementioned period. In view of
the maternity leave cases, 39 this statute may also violate the due process
clause. Although pregnancy is a characteristic unique to women, not all
pregnant women are incapable of working within such fixed periods. Thus,
this statute would also run afoul of the ERA. Any man is permitted to show
that he is willing and able to work to obtain unemployment benefits. There-
fore, since a pregnant woman is precluded from doing this, the statute
discriminates on the basis of sex. The basis for this distinction in treatment
does not meet the strict standards imposed by the amendment, and thereby
violates the ERA.40 This statute could be revised to satisfy both the due
process requirements and the ERA by simply eliminating any presumption
84. § 290.060, RSMo 1969.
35. Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. School Bd., 39 U.S.L.W. 2686 (E.D. Va.
1971). This case was combined with another case and affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, U.S. , 949 S. Ct.
791 (1974). However, the affirmance was on the grounds that fixed period
maternity leaves violate the due process clause. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Powell agreed with the district court that mandatory fixed period maternity
leaves violate the equal protection clause.
36. Schattmen v. Texas Employ. Comm'n, 880 F. Supp. 328, 329 (W.D.
Tex. 1971), revd, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1107
(1978). The district court decision was reversed on the ground that an agency
of a state government was not a "person" who could be an employer under Title
VII. Title VII was amended in 1972 to include governmental agencies and
political subdivisions within the definition of a person who could be an employer
under the act. Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
37. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, U.S. , 94 S. Ct.
791 (1974).
38. § 288.040(1) (2), RSMo 1969.
39. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, U.S. 94 S. Ct.
791 (1974).
40. See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
1974]
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and permitting the Unemployment Commission to make findings in each
individual case as to the applicant's ability to work.
4. Missouri Fair Employment Act
Finally, certain provisions of the Missouri's fair employment act" are
of doubtful validity under present law and under the ERA. Subdivision
eight provides, in part, that it shall not be unlawful to differentiate in
compensation, terms, privileges, or conditions of employment on the basis
of sex. It further provides that any pension, retirement, profit sharing, wel-
fare, or death benefit plan is not an unlawful employment practice although
it provides for the retirement of female employees at a younger age than
male employees. It also provides for differences in annuity, death, and sur-
vivor's benefits between widows and widowers of employees. It is curious
that this section exempts from the coverage of the statute such forms of sex
discrimination in employment. Retirement plans which require women to
retire at an earlier age than men have been found to violate Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.42 But because Title VII applies only to employers of
15 or more persons, employers who have less than 15 employees will not
be violating either Title VII or the Missouri fair employment act. However,
such a provision in an employer's retirement plan may violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Frontiero v. Richardson4 3
suggested that dependent benefit plans which provide for different eligi-
bility requirements between men and women may violate equal protection
if the requisite "state action" is present. 4 Although the Missouri Act does
not require such discrimination, it may be viewed as "encouraging" or
"persuading" private employers to discriminate in this manner. Thus, in
view of some of the broader notions of state action utilized by the Supreme
41. § 296.020, RSMo 1969.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1972); Bartmess v. Drewry U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d
1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
48. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). A federal statute provided that a male serviceman
could claim his wife as a dependent for purposes of increased allowances and
medical benefits without actually showing that she was, in fact, dependent on
her husband. However, a woman had to prove that her husband, in fact, received
over half his support from her in order to obtain these benefits. The court found
that this differentiation in treatment denied equal protection of the law under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. But see Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S.
Ct. 1734 (1974), holding that a "rational basis" was sufficient justification for
discrimination based on sex. In Kohr v. Weinberger, 43 U.S.L.W. 2066 (E.D.
Pa. July 26, 1974) the court applied Kahn in upholding a provision of the Social
Security Act which permitted women to use a shorter period of years than men
in computing "average monthly wages." The court held that because of past
discrimination against women in the job market the provision was reasonable
and constitutional.
44. This decision raised doubts about the validity of a portion of the Mis-
souri workmen's compensation statute. Section 287.240, RSMo 1969, in defining
those dependents who are entitled to an award of death benefits, presumes that
a surviving wife is a dependent of her husband, but generally requires a showing
that a surviving husband was dependent upon his decedent wife.
However, Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974) indicates that this statute
is valid if there is a reasonable justification, greater than administration con-
venience, for the distinction between the sexes.
[Vol. 39
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Court in recent years, 4n the provision may violate the equal protection
clause. The ERA would also invalidate such provisions but would require
greater justification for discrimination than the "rational basis" now re-
quired by the courts for classifications based on sex.
B. Domestic Relations Law
The ERA will have a significant effect on Missouri's domestic rela-
tions law. Although the new divorce reform act" has introduced a con-
siderable degree of equality into this area, the ERA would impose some
additional changes.
Though the divorce reform act has moved Missouri toward greater
equality between the sexes in marriage dissolutions, the beginnings of the
marital relationship are marked with inequality under the law. Section
451.090, RSMo 1969, permits females to marry without the consent of their
guardians at age 18. In contrast, males are not permitted to marry without
the consent of their guardians until age 21. Even though such a differen-
tiation may be based on the general view that women mature, physically
and mentally, at an earlier age than men, this tendency is not true in all
cases. Under the strict test of the ERA, such differentiation in treatment
would not be permitted. As a result, the courts or the legislature would
have to settle on one age of consent for men and women. Of course, making
the age of majority 18 would have this effect.
Once married, a wife suffers some legal disabilities. Though the mar-
ried women's property acts47 have alleviated some of the common law
disabilities concerning property rights, in some other respects, married
women are presently no better off than they were at common law.48 For
some purposes a married woman has no legal identity apart from that of
her husband. This particular "merger" takes two forms: (1) The legal
domicile of a married woman is that of her husband unless she establishes
a separate residence for the purpose of initiating dissolution proceedings
or is otherwise justified in leaving her husband;49 and (2) the very strong
custom and possible law that a married woman assumes the surname of
her husband upon marriage.
45. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 869 (1967), a state constitutional
provision prohibited restrictions on an individual's right to sell his property to
whomever he chose. The Court held that the mere fact that this provision en-
couraged private racial discrimination was sufficient to constitute state action
under the fourteenth amendment.
46. §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo 1973 Supp.
47. See § 451.250-.290, RSMo 1969.
48. At common law, a married woman was incapable of entering into a
contract or engaging in business without her husband's consent. 2 F. PoLLocK &
F. MATLrrE, THE HIsToRY OF ENGLSH LAw 403 (1st ed. 1895). Conversely, a
married man was liable for his wife's debts and torts incurred during coverture.
Id. at 402.
The best illustration of this legal unity was the proposition that a husband
could not make. a direct conveyance of property to his wife, since.it would only
result in a trust in himself for the benefit of his wife. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 177
Mo. App. 469, 119 S.W. 489 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909).
49. Walton v. Walton, 6-S.W.2d 1025 (St.-L. Mo. App. 1928); Hairs v.
Hairs, 222 Mo. App. 941, 300 S.W. 540 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
1974]
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The objectionable feature about the first form of "merger" under the
ERA is not that one spouse is conclusively presumed to have the same
residence as the other spouse, but instead, that it is always the wife who is
subject to this presumption. Assuming that the state can show an interest
in requiring a married couple to have only one legal residence, the test
should be based on some legitimate classification other than sex.
It is unclear in Missouri whether the custom that a married woman
assumes her husband's surname rises to the status of being a law.50 Section
527.270, RSMo 1969, admonishes circuit courts to grant a change of sur-
name only if it would be proper and not detrimental to the interests of any
other person. The ERA probably would not permit either a requirement
or a presumption that a married woman assumes her husband's surname.
As discussed in regard to legal domicile, the State probably could require
that a married couple assume a common name. If that statute did not grant
any preference for the surname of either spouse, it would be valid under
the amendment.
1. Rights of Husband and Wife Inter Se
Prior to the enactment of Section 451.250 and 451.290, RSMo (1969), 51
and their predecessors, a woman, upon entering marriage, lost most of the
ownership and control of her property.52 However, these statutes pre-
50. At common law it was only a custom. MacDougall, Married Women's
Common Law Right To Their Own Surnames, 3 WommN's RiGHTs LAw RFPoRTER
2, 4 (Winter-Spring 1972-73). American cases are split as to whether a married
woman's surname, by law, becomes that of her husband. Compare Stuart v. Board
of Super. of Elect., 295 A.2d 228 (Md. 1972); State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114
Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961), with Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Exec.
Comm., 156 So. 2d 800, 802 (La. 1963); Kelle v. Crab Orchard Rural Fire
Prot. Dist., 83 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Neb. 1957).
Section 452.100, RSMo 1969, authorized the court to change the wifes
surname to that of her maiden name or any other prior surname when the wife
obtained the divorce. No provision was made for the case where the wife was
the defendant in the divorce proceeding. Thus, under the old "fault" conception
of divorce, it could be arguey that a wife could change her surname only when
her husband failed to fulfill his martial obligations and, thereby, lost the right
to require his wife to retain his surname.
Section 452.100, RSMo 1969, was repealed with the enactment of the di-
vorce reform act. The new act does not make any provision allowing a married
woman to change her name upon divorce, but considering the specific authority
of § 527.270, RSMo 1969, a change of surname upon dissolution of the marriage
is undoubtedly permitted. In Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), the district court held that a statute in effect
requiring a married woman to use her husband's surname had a rational basis
and did not violate the equal protection clause.
51. These statutes give a married woman the power to transact business
and convey property independently.
52. The title to the wife's personal property passed to the husband when
he reduced it to his p ossession. 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 48, at
402. As for the wifes real property the husband automatically had the right to
the rents and profits, and upon the birth of a live child, the right to possession.
Id. at 405. The wife had to resort to certain equitable devices to retain any
control over her property. 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife §§ 229-31 (1944). See
Kantowitz, Sex Based Discrimination in American Law (Part Two): Law and the
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cluded many potential violations of the ERA.5 One possible remaining
problem is a judicial presumption that the household goods of a family
belong to the husband.14 Although the wife could rebut this presumption
by showing her ownership, such a presumption would be invalid under the
ERA. The new divorce reform act precludes granting the household goods
to the husband because of such a presumption.5 5 Section 442.050, RSMo
1969, continues to be effective, however, and probably violates the ERA.
This statute allows a married woman to convey her real estate by a power
of attorney authorizing its conveyance, but only if she executes and ac-
knowledges the power jointly with her husband.
Another problem that remains despite the married women's property
acts is the law regarding control of the marital household. This area of the
law remains unchanged from common law days. For example, when the
married women's property acts were enacted, the legislature allowed the
husband to retain the primary right to claim the homestead exemption
from attachment and execution.56 Thus, the legislature acknowledged the
husband's position as the legally recognized head of the household. As the
head of the household, the husband may, within reason, determine where
the marital unit will reside regardless of the wife's desires. 7 If the wife
refuses to go along with the husband, then she has deserted him and may
suffer the consequences.58 In addition, the husband, at least where he sup-
plies the major part of the household's income, has the exclusive right to
determine the standard of living for the household. This is true no matter
how unreasonable that standard of living is in regard to the income of the
Married Woman, 12 St. L.L.J. 8, 6 (1967). Also, the wife's services and earnings
during the marriage belonged to her husband. 41 C.J.S., supra at § 17.
58. Section 451.250, RSMo 1969, provides that a married woman has the
same legal status with respect to her property as a femme sole (single woman).
See Keysor (Parts One and Two), Legal Status of Women in Missouri, 1 ST. L.
L. RFv. 1 (1915). The wife is accorded equal ownership of property held in the
entireties. Schwind v. O'Halloran, 846 Mo. 486, 142 S.W.2d 55 (1940);
Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEmp. L.Q. 24, 85 (1951). One case went so far
as to hold that a wife could sue her husband for conversion due to his sale of
property held in the entireties. Ray v. Ray, 836 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Spr. Mo. App.
1960). Moreover, with the abolition of dower and curtesy in Missouri, neither
spouse has any sort of inter vivos interest in the other spouse's property. § 474.110,
RSMo 1969. Currently, the law only affords a spouse the right, upon the death
of the other spouse, to elect a statutory share, rather than take under the other
spouse's will. § 474.160, RSMo 1969.
54. 41 C.J.S., supra note 52, at § 17.
55. Section 452.330, RSMo 1978 Supp., provides that all property acquired
during the marriage by either spouse is "marital property" which shall be divided
between the spouses as the court deems just. The factors involved in dividing the
marital property include: (1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition
of the marital property; (2) the value of the property set apart for each; and(3) economic circumstances of the parties.
56. § 451.290, RSMo 1969. The homestead exemption is provided by§ 518.475, RSMo 1969. The statute gives the head of the household the right of
asserting the exemption. The husband is also considered to be the head of the
family for the purpose of claiming the person property exemptions provided by
§ 513.435, RSMo 1969. In re Diehl, 53 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Mo. 1944).
57. Campbell v. Campbell, 281 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
58. Easley v. Easley, 266 S.W.2d 28, 31 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
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household. The courts refuse to intervene in disputes over the standard of
living for a family while the wife remains living with the husband. 59 Also,
as head of the household the husband has a right to receive the wife's
services. 0
The ERA would invalidate much of the husband's legal control over
the household. However, it is difficult to predict how the courts or the
legislature will resolve the problem of who is to control the household. The
State must demonstrate some interest in order to justify any requirement
that one spouse or the other be the legally recognized head of the house-
hold, and it is doubtful that this can be done. Perhaps the best solution
would be to leave the question of family management to the persons in-
volved or to custom.
2. Duty of Support
At common law the wife was said to enjoy a right to be supported by
her husband.' Moreover, she was relieved of the primary responsibility of
supporting any children of her marriage-that responsibility being assigned
to the husband also .62 There was, however, in Missouri no corresponding
duty to support the husband,3 regardless of his circumstances."4
The married women's property acts had no effect on the duty to sup-
port, even though they eliminated a major part of the basis for imposing
this duty.6r5 In Missouri, even when a wife was more financially capable of
supporting herself and her children than her husband, he was not relieved
of his duties of support. 6 Moreover, upon dissolution of the marriage,
these same rules applied to the statutory duty to pay alimony, 7 at least
where the wife was not at fault.
The new Missouri divorce reform act does not completely abrogate the
common law rules as to the duty of support, but it does create some in-
roads into that doctrine. Section 452.335, RSMo 1974 Supp., authorizes
the court to grant a maintenance (alimony) order to either spouse in a
dissolution (divorce) or legal separation proceeding. Section 452.315,
RSMo 1974 Supp., allows the court to award temporary maintenance to
either spouse, and Section 452.355 RSMo 1974 Supp. permits the court
to award attorney's fees and court costs to either spouse.
The ERA would require the courts or the legislature to go only one
step further. That is, the general duty to support should be imposed on
both the marital partners throughout the course of the marriage, but fi-
59. Hoynes v. Hoynes, 218 S.W.2d 823, 829 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
60. Tryon v. Casey, 416 S.W.2d 252, 260 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Greer v.
McCrory, 192 S.W.2d 431, 442 (K.C. Mo. App. 1946); 41 C.J.S. Husband and
Wife § 17 (1944).
61. In Re Wood's Estate, 288 Mo. 588, 232 S.W. 671 (En Banc 1921).
62. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 S.W.2d 674, 677 (St. L. Mo. App. 1972).
63. State ex rel. George v. Mitchell, 230 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Spr. Mo. App.
1950).
64. Some states impose a duty, by statute, upon the wife to support the
husband while he is incapacitated. 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 16 (1944).
65. Tryon v. Casey, 416 S.W.2d 252, 260 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
66. Broemmer v. Broemmer, 219 S.W.2d 300, 304 (St. L:" Mo. App. 1949).
67. Laweing v. Laweing, 21 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Spr. Mo. App. 1929).
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nancial support should be imposed on the basis of a partner's ability to
contribute to the family income. A partner's obligation could be served by
responsibility for taking care of the household. The United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary envisioned this arrangement:
Where one spouse is the primary wage earner and the other runs
the home, the wage earner would have a duty to support the
spouse who stays at home in compensation for the performance of
his or her duties. 8
Similarly, the legislature could use this basis for assessing the primary duty
of supporting the children of the marriage. The imposition of the duty of
support on this basis could reach familiar results and should obviate the
argument that the ERA will impair the family as a basic social unit and as
an institution for child raising. 9
Various Missouri statutes enacted before Missouri's divorce reform act
contain provisions pertaining to the enforcement of the duty of support
owed to the wife.70 Presumably, some of these provisions are modified by
the new divorce reform act to include a husband who is entitled to support
from his wife which was assessed by the court in a legal separation or a
dissolution proceeding. Those provisions which relate to the enforcement
of the duty of support where there has been no legal separation or dissolu-
tion would probably, under the ERA, be extended to a husband who is
entitled to support from his wife.
3. Child Custody
Current child custody law discriminates against men in the awarding
of the custody of children, born both in and out of wedlock. For children
born during the course of marriage, section 452.375, IRSMo 1973, purports
to give the husband and wife equal footing in the process of deciding the
custody of children upon dissolution of the marriage. 1 However, the
statute may not affect the Missouri case law rule that, all other things being
equal, the mother should have custody of a child during his tender years.72
In theory, the ERA would abolish this case law preference. However, since
the best interests of the child are the governing factor in making the cus-
68. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972).
69. Ryman, A Comment on Family Property Rights and the Proposed 27th
Amendment, 22 Dpuum L. REv. 505, 510-11, 515 (1973).
70. § 452.130, RSMo 1969, providing for separate maintenance for an
abandoned wife; § 452.140, RSMo 1969, providing that none of a husbands
property shall be exempt from execution in a proceeding executed by a wife for
maintenance; § 452.190, RSMo 1969, permitting a court to sell a husband's
property to provide for the support of the wife; § 452.210, RSMo 1969, allowing
the court to authorize holders of husband's personalty to pay the same over to
the wife; and § 452.220, RSMo 1969, entitling a wife to the proceeds of earnings
of minor children.
71. It was held that the predecessor of the present statute, § 452.120 RSMo
1969, only established the mother's legal capacity to be the child's legal guardian.
In Re Krauthoff, 191 Mo. App. 149, 166, 177 S.W. 1112, 1118 (K.C. Ct. App.
1915). At common law, the father alone was the natural guardian of his chil-
dren. See Wells v. Wells, 117 S.W.2d 700 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938).
72. Schneider v. Schneider, 248 S.W.2d 59 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952); Brake
v. Brake, 244 S.W.2d 786 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951).
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tody determination, courts enjoy wide discretion in the matter. Thus, it
seems unlikely that many courts facing custody decisions would disregard
the traditional view as to the superiority of maternal love and maternal
society. So long as the courts are careful not to couch the language of their
opinions in terms of a general preference for the care of a mother in a
child's tender years, the ERA might have nominal impact on these decisions.
In Missouri, the mother is the only natural guardian of a child born
out of wedlock.73 So long as the mother is fit74 she is entitled to the custody
and care of the child, apparently, to the exclusion of the father. Moreover,
section 474.060, RSMo 1969, when viewed in light of the common law,7"
permits only the mother to inherit from or through her illegitimate child.
Conversely, the child can only inherit from or through its mother. Although
the father now has an obligation to support the child,76 the validity of lim-
iting his other rights or duties is now doubtful.1 7 Such differential treatment
of the parents would almost certainly fail under the ERA. Although the
"no inheritance rule" with respect to the father could be supported on the
ground that it is frequently difficult to establish the paternity of an illegiti-
mate child,78 such a reason is probably insufficient to overcome the heavy
burden which the state would face under the ERA in justifying a law which
discriminates against one parent on the basis of sex. Under the ERA, the
father should be permitted to inherit from an illegitimate child. As for the
child's custody, the solution is not as easy. Simply to say that both parents
are entitled to custody would be unacceptable, because the parents may
be uninclined to live together and have joint custody. On the other hand, to
say that neither parent is to have automatic legal custody of the child will
leave his legal situation undetermined, and may do so permanently if
neither parent bothers to institute custody proceedings. Perhaps, a statu-
tory provision awarding the mother automatic legal custody on its birth,
but affording the father a right to commence proceedings to determine
whose custody would be in the best interests of the child, would survive
the requirements of the ERA.
C. Criminal Law
Various criminal statutes will be affected by the ERA. If the amend-
ment is ratified, the legislature should give immediate attention to certain
parts of Missouri criminal law. If a criminal statute is found to violate the
ERA, the courts will probably nullify it rather than extend its coverage to
include the other sex.7 9 Consequently, unless the legislature acts within the
78. § 475.025, RSMo 1969.
74. See In Re R.D.H.S., 370 S.W.2d, 661 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
75. At common law, an illegitimate child could not inherit from either parent
and vice versa, 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 24, 29 (1938).
76. R. v. R., 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
77. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
78. Such an argument was made in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164, 171 (1972). The Court struck down a Louisiana statute which denied
illegitimate children the right to share in workmen's compensation benefits
where the legitimate children had already exhausted the maximum benefits.
79. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
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two year time limitation, it will find certain criminal statutes invalidated
by the courts.
1. Crimes by Force Against Women
Sections 559.260 and 559.270, RSMo 1969, provide that any one forcibly
ravishing any woman; or without her consent, administering any liquid or
substance which reduces her resistance and ravishes her, is guilty of rape.
The crime of rape involves two points of sexual discrimination: (1) Only
men can commit the crime of rape;80 and (2) only women can be victims
of the crime of rape.81 It seems unlikely that a court would ever nullify
these statutes on this basis. Some commentators suggest that the limitation
of the crime to women victims is a possible classification based on unique
physical characteristics of women. Arguably, the element of forcible pene-
tration involved in, the act of rape makes the classification a permissable
one.8 2 Another justification is that the rape statutes protect women from an
unwanted exposure to the possibility of an illegitimate pregnancy.
Section 559.280, RSMo 1969, prohibits the forcing of a woman, against
her will, to marry any person; or, by menace or by durress, to cause the
woman to be defiled. The failure of the statute to include in its coverage
male victims8, is an apparent violation of the ERA. The justifications ad-
vanced to save the rape statutes are inapplicable to this statute.
8 4 There-
fore, it may well be invalid under the amendment.
The Proposed Criminal Code for Missouri would make the crime of
rape sex-neutral.8 5 Under the Proposed Code, a woman can be guilty of
rape and a man can be the victim of a rape.8 6 However, the Proposed Code
fails to provide a sex-neutral substitute for section 559.280, RSMo 1969, so
that statute would be in jeopardy without further legislative attention.
2. Nonforcible Sexual Relations
Missouri has several statutes intended to protect women under certain
ages from sexual intercourse under varying circumstances.8 7 All of these
80. State v. Oliver, 333 Mo. 1231, 64 S.W.2d 118 (1933).
81. Section 559.260, RSMo 1969, defines forcible rape as "[F]orcibly
ravishing any woman .... " Sodomy is a crime in Missouri. § 563.230, RSMo
1969. However, it does not carry the same penalty as does rape, even though it
is committed without the consent of the victim.
82. Emerson, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 955-56 § n.205 (1971).
83. A classic example of a violation of this statute with respect to a male
victim would be the "shotgun wedding.
84. The portion of the statute forbidding the use of menace or duress to
defile a woman may be valid under the rationale which justifies the rape statutes,
but the other portion of the statute which prohibits the use of force to cause a
woman to marry someone against her will does not stand up under this rationale,
because sexual intercourse is not an element of the crime.
85. PFop. NEW Mo. Curvm. CODE § 11.030(1), Comments (1973).
86. Id.
87. § 559.260, RSMo 1969 (any person having carnal and unlawful knowl-
edge of any female under the age of sixteen shall be guilty of rape); § 559.290,
RSMo 1969 (any person who shall take a female under the age of eighteen from
a parent or guardian for the purposes of prostitution or concubinage, or any
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statutes share the discriminatory features of the rape statutes. Only men
can violate these statutes and only women are protected by them. Thus,
the question confronting the courts will be whether or not these statutes
can fit within the unique physical characteristics exception to the ERA. If
not, they are invalid under the amendment.
The courts might sustain section 559.260, RSMo 1969, which makes
any person having carnal and unlawful knowledge of a female under the
age of sixteen guilty of rape. The basis for sustaining this statute could be
that the statute protects females below the age of sixteen from an exposure
to the possibility of pregnancy. Dut to the age of the victims, they lack the
capacity to consent. However, this same justification is inapplicable to the
remainder of the statutes dealing with nonforcible sexual relations, be-
cause they are not directed at preventing pregnancy. For example, section
559.300, RSMo 1969, provides that any person over the age of seventeen
who shall have carnal knowledge of any sixteen to eighteen year old female
of previously chaste character shall be guilty of a felony. By its terms this
statute limits criminal liability to those over the age of seventeen. If its
purpose is to protect females in this age group from pregnancy, this limi-
tation is irrational. Similarly, the other statutes in this area contain limita-
tions which are not necessary if the sole purpose of the statutes is to pro-
tect young women from a pregnancy to which they could not validly
consent.88
The Proposed Criminal Code, if adopted, would bring Missouri's crimi-
nal statutes into compliance with the ERA. Although it does retain some
prohibitions 9 against sexual relations with under-age persons, either sex
is a potential victim or offender.90 Thus, these provisions are sex-neutral.
3. Prostitution and Related Statutes
Section 563.010, RSMo 1969, prohibits prostitution and solicitation for
the purposes of prostitution. Only a woman, however, can be a prostitute.9'
parent or guardian who consents to the same shall be punished not exceeding
five years); § 559.800, RSMo 1969 (any person over the age of seventeen who
shall have carnal knowledge of any female between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen and of previously chaste character shall be guilty of a felony); § 559.310,
RSMo 1969 (prohibits the seduction of any female of good repute under the age
of twenty-one by promise of marriage); § 559.320, RSMo 1969 (prescribes a
penalty of up to five years for a guardian of a female under the age of eighteen
or any other person into whose care such a female has been confided who has
carnal knowledge of her while she is in his care).
88. § 559.290, RSMo 1969 (does not require the occurrence of sexual
intercourse); § 559.310, RSMo 1969 (limits its coverage to seduction by promise
of marriage and to females of good repute); § 559.320, RSMo 1969 (limits iti
coverage to sexual intercourse while the female is in the care and custody of
the offender).
89. Pnop. NEw Mo. Cnnm. CODE § 11.030(b), .040(1), .050(1), .090(1)
(1973).
90. See PROP. NEW Mo. Cnm . CODE § 11.030, Comments (1973).
91. St. Louis v. Green, 190 S.W.2d 634, 635 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945).
Sections 563.020-.100, RSMo 1969, prohibit various activities related to
prostitution (e.g., receiving the earnings of a prostitute, interstate or intrastate
transportation of a woman for purposes of prostitution, and permitting a female
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There is little apparent justification under the ERA's unique physical char-
acteristics exception for defining prostitutes to include only women 2 Thus,
the legislature will have to give immediate attention to these statutes if the
ERA is ratified.
The Proposed Criminal Code for Missouri attempts to render the area
of prostitution sex-neutral. A man can be a prostitute,9 3 and the engaging
or attempt to engage (patronizing) a prostitute would be a crime 4 How-
ever, the Proposed Criminal Code treats prostitution and patronizing as
separate crimes, and prescribes a lower penalty for patronizing." This
difference raises a difficult problem under the ERA. Although each crime
is sex-neutral on its face, the most common result will be that a man will
receive a lesser punishment for his role in the same illegal transaction than
will the woman. The legislative history of the ERA fails to suggest whether
it is intended to invalidate laws which on their face are sex-neutral, but
which, in fact, have a greater impact on one sex.
4. Miscellaneous Criminal Laws Which Will
Be Affected by the Amendment
Section 559.400, RSMo 1969, makes it a misdeameanor for anyone to
slander a female by falsely charging or accusing her of incest, fornication,
adultery or whoredom in the presence of others. Due to the failure of this
statute to extend similar protection to men, it would violate the amend-
ment. Since it is a criminal statute, a court would have no choice but to
nullify the statute.96
Section 559.170, TRSMo 1969, prohibits a mother from drowning, bury-
ing or otherwise concealing the body of her child for the purpose of con-
cealing the fact of its birth. The ERA would probably invalidate this
statute, because no one can be convicted under the statute as a principal
or an accessory, unless the mother participates in the crime. 7 Thus, the
father of the child, acting alone, could conceal the body of the child and
not violate this statute. The Proposed Criminal Code for Missouri extends
this statute to apply to anyone who conceals the body of the child,98 which
would satisfy the ERA.
Missouri case law relating to criminal activity has established at least
one rule which violates the ERA, i.e., the doctrine of implied coercion.
This doctrine provides that when a wife commits a criminal act in the
presence of her husband, there is a rebuttable presumption that she does
so under the coercion of her husband. If coerced, she normally is not re-
under age 18 to enter a bawdy house). Although both men and women can be
punished under these statutes, they also discriminate on the basis of sex because
only women can be prostitutes.
92. A distinction may be made between selling sexual intercourse and
buying sexual intercourse.
93. nop. NEw Mo. Cmm. CODE §§ 12.010(2), (4) (1973).
94. P.op. NEW Mo. Cnvm. CODE §§ 12.010(3), (3) (b) (1978).95. Compare PTop. NEw Mo. Crnm. CoDE: § 12.020(2) with § 12.030(2),
and see §§ 3.010(1) (f)-(g) (1973).
96. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
97. State v. Baker, 297 Mo. 249, 248 S.W. 956 (1923).
98. PRoP. NEW Mo. Cnma. CODE §§ 3.110(1)-(2) (1973).
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sponsible for her activity.9 9 This presumption rests on a highly stereotyped
view of women, and ignores individual characteristics; thus, it undoubtedly
violates the ERA. The courts would undoubtedly nullify this law rather than
extend the presumption to men since the latter solution would result in a
presumption that each coerced the other.
D. Succession and Other Related Laws
The majority of Missouri's succession and succession-related laws are
non-discriminatory in regard to sex. Either spouse has the right to a forced
share, the homestead allowance and exempt property. Also, both spouses
are entitled to the various exemptions under the state inheritance tax law.
However, section 474.140, RSMo 1969, establishes certain conduct
which will bar a spouse from his or her inheritance rights. This statute bars
the statutory inheritance rights of a wife who "after being ravished con-
sents to her ravisher . . . ."10 In contrast, the husband's statutory in-
heritance rights are barred only if he cohabits with another woman or
deserts his wife. Since this statute provides for unequal treatment of men
and women, it will have to be modified to satisfy the ERA.
Other Missouri statutes10' provide the wife with an insurable interest
in the life of her husband, and further provide that any policy taken out
on his life for her benefit will be free from the claims of his creditors or
representatives. The purpose of these statutes was to ease the common law
rule that a married woman's assets were subject to her husband's debts.102
However, under the present law a married woman's assets are generally
no longer subject to her husband's debts. 03 Therefore, sections 376.530,
.560, RSMo 1969, no longer serve their original purpose. Since the statutes
discriminate superficially, the courts will probably nullify them as violating
the ERA.
Section 376.550, RSMo 1969, affords an unmarried woman an insurable
interest in her brother or father's life. The purpose of this statute is to
protect women who are financially dependent on their fathers or broth-
ers.104 However beneficial this statute may be, it conflicts with the ERA
since there is insufficient reason for affording this protection to women
only.105 Since unmarried men are not usually financially dependent on their
parents or brothers and sisters, it would not serve the purposes of this
statute to extend this benefit to men. Accordingly, a court would probably
also nullify this statute under the amendment. 0 6
99. State v. Ready, 251 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1952).
100. § 474.140, RSMo 1969.
101. §§ 376.530, .560, RSMo 1969.
102. See State v. Mitchell, 230 S.W.2d 116, 130 (Spr. Mo. App. 1950).
103. § 451.250(1), RSMo 1969. But see § 451.250(2), RSMo 1969.
104. At common law, the wife had no insurable interest in the life of her
husband. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419 (1871).
105. The Senate rejected a provision which excluded laws extending protec-
tions or exemptions to wives, mothers or widows from the coverage of the ERA.
118 Cong. Ree. 9523 (1972).
106. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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E. Rights and Duties of State Citizenship
Subsequent to ratification of the nineteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution granting women the right to vote, women have enjoyed
the same political rights as men.107 However, they do not share all the
same civic duties.
Two examples of this in Missouri are service in the state militia andjury duty. Women are exempt from compulsory service in the state militiajust as they are from compulsory service in the United.,States armed
forces.' 08 Similarly, women may be exempted from compulsory jury duty.109
These exemptions were intended to spare women who are homemakers
and mothers from the hardships of being taken away from their wifely and
maternal duties and responsibilities.'" However, under the ERA, these
statutes are overbroad. Not all women are homemakers and mothers. Thus,
exemptions for individuals who take care of a household and who have thejob of raising children would be perfectly valid under the amendment, but
exemption could not be provided merely on the basis of sex.
The ERA would require not only that women be subject to compulsory
military service on the basis of individual ability, but also that they enjoy
equality of opportunity to share the benefits of military service."' Responsi-
bilities, exemptions, and opportunities would depend upon needs and
abilities.- 2
F. Single Sex Schools and Organizations
The state and federal governments now provide direct and indirect
benefits to private schools and organizations in the form of direct financial
aid and tax benefits. Those schools and organizations that continue to limit
their admissions and membership to one sex may lose such benefits with
passage of the ERA. Though such organizations may not themselves be
"state actors," governmental support of such discriminatory activities would
be a sufficient degree of state involvement to violate the amendment."13
107. E.g., Mo. CONST. art. VII, § 10 provides that no person shall be dis-
qualified from holding public office in this state because of sex.
108. Section 41.050, RSMo 1969, provides that all citizens of the state be-
tween the ages of eighteen and sixty-four are potential members of the militia.
However, §§ 41.050, .060, RSMo 1969, exempt those citizens who are exempt
from service in the United States armed services. 50 U.S.C. §§ 453-454(a) (1971)
impose a duty of military service on male citizens and residents between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-six.
109. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(b). See also § 494.081, RSMo 1969. Women
can be excused from the jury panel on their request.
110. Hoyt v. Florida, 868 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961); United States v. St. Clair,
291 F. Supp. 122, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
111. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-14 (1972).
112. For a more elaborate discussion of the effect of the ERA on military
service, see Emerson, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, supra note 11, at 967-78; Comment, The Equal Rights
Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1588 (1973).
118. See Gallagher, Desegregation: The Effect of the Proposed Equal Rights
Amendment on Single-Sex Colleges, 18 ST. L.U.L.J. 41 (1978).
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III. CONCLUSION
Although the ERA's affect on Missouri law would be considerable,
most of the problems can be remedied. With the exception of governmental
support of private schools and organizations which limit their enrollment
or membership to one sex, sex-neutral laws can be enacted which will
achieve the same purposes as their sexually discriminatory predecessors.
This comment takes no position regarding the social desirability or
non-desirability of the ERA. It can be argued that the amendment should
be ratified, because it will have minimal effect on current laws while
insuring equal rights for women. On the other hand, it can be argued that
the amendment is unnecessary since a little extra legislative effort would
cure sexual discrimination in our statutory and case law. The ultimate
question of the ERAs ratification however will have to rest on broader
grounds of social and political policy.
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